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1. Introduction 
In-depth analysis of an attack strategy enables possibility to prevent it or when it is 
inevitable to minimize its adverse effects. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) base their 
operation on the built-in patterns of various attack strategies. Aforementioned strategies can 
be represented by different means like: augmented goal-tree [6], attack trees [17] (originated 
from on fault trees), attack graphs [14], or augmented software fault trees [4]. 
In augmented goal tree representation [6], the attack is expressed by sequences of logically 
related steps. The root of this tree is the goal of the attack, e.g., “Modification of a file”. The 
sub-goals are associated with the roots of the sub-trees. The basic constructs are the OR, AND, 
Ordered-AND constructs. For example, in order to achieve the sub-goal represented as the 
root of the Ordered-AND construct, all sub-sub-goals have to be reached in required order. 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) [3], which is a base of the attack tree [17] analysis, is a deductive 
probabilistic assessment technique. The FTA is the backward approach. In the fault tree, the 
root is associated with the top event being the hazard, e.g. “The Intrusion takes control over 
the Victim”. Then direct causes of the hazard are considered. Next, the causes of the above 
causes are analyzed. Hence, different ways in which the hazard can occur are investigated. 
The FTA can be used to determine the following: minimal cut sets of faults that cause a 
hazard, probabilities of the hazard and faults. Therefore, the FTA can be used in 
identification which events are critical and should therefore be subjected to monitoring. 
Traditional Fault Trees (FT) are widely criticized [14] due to many, widely known 
drawbacks, like inability to model multiple attack attempts, time dependencies, or access 
controls as well as for luck of modeling cycles. 
In the attacks graphs [14], nodes symbolize the class of machines the attacker accessed and 
as well user level of privileges. The arcs are labeled by attackers’ activities. By assigning 
probabilities of success on the arcs, one can identify the attack paths with the highest 
probability of success.  
Augmented software fault trees [4] were defined in order to overcome disadvantages of the 
classical fault trees. In this approach, a trust, a context, and temporal orderings can be 
defined. The trust relationship expresses that some members of a distributed system trust 
other members of the system. Context describes which subsets of intrusive events occur in 
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some context. The activities of attackers and network are time dependent. Event and 
conditions involved in an intrusion often must occur in a particular order. In order to 
express the temporal orderings, the interval temporal logic [1] is applied. In this logic, the 
structure of time is a simple linear model of time, i.e., there is one past and one future only. 
Therefore, the attack scenario is a deterministic one.  
The fault tree with time dependencies (FTTD) [9], [10] can express non-deterministic attacks 
too. In the chapter, FTTD are used to describe attacks with emphasis put on timing 
properties. In the FTTD, event duration times, delay times between the cause events and the 
result event can be described by the time intervals given by its minimal and the maximal 
lengths. FTTD are used in verification whether the IDS reacts sufficiently quick on the attack 
in order to avoid the results of the attack. 
The fault trees could constitute a basis for increased security awareness in any organization 
by supporting IT infrastructure audit preparation by drawing conclusion out of FT analysis 
and based on that security survey creation [20]. 
The structure of the chapter is the following. In, Section 2, models of two attacks (SYN-Flood 
called “The Victim trusts the Intruder” and generic “The Intruder has access to data in 
server”) are described. In Section 3, FTTD in general, and FTTD for this attack are presented. 
Then the analysis of timing properties of this attack using the FTTD is given. In Section 4, 
authors exemplify protections against the attacks and present methods that increase security 
awareness and facilitate enforcing the desired security level. In the last section, conclusions 
are being stated. 
The details of the TCP/IP protocol are given in [7], [8], [12], [15] and [16]. 
2. System description 
We base our analysis on two cases, exemplified by following attack examples: 
1.  “The Intruder has access to data in server”, 
2. “The Victim trusts the Intruder”.  
2.1 Example #1: “The Intruder has access to the data stored on server” 
Analyzed system is illustrated by Figure 1. There are two possible situations shown: 
a. The intruder have access to the terminal T, onsite (within company’s network) or uses 
trusted VPN connection (accessing INTRANET from outside) impersonated as a trusted 
employee with appropriate credentials (that were stolen or extracted during snooping 
or eavesdropping). 
b. Once data on a server is not properly secured, or data access is not authenticated from 
within INTRANET, an Intruder can easily breach security or bypass access rights (e.g. 
weak, well known or no password) or access data directly when hooked up to intranet 
with his own machine. 
Following assumptions (for example #1) were taken: 
- there might be basic (based on password type “something I know”) or advanced 
authentication smart card / token 
- TCP/IP system access with MAC address verification   
- vital company data is stored on server 
- credentials can be stolen or snooped   
- MAC address can be altered  
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I (Intuder)
with its own computer
Terminal T
Intruder uses 
terminal
b)
a)
INTRANET
Server
 
Fig. 1. (Example #1)  Scenario – “The Intruder has access to the data stored on server” 
2.2 Example #2: “The Victim trusts the Intruder”  
This attack was already quite thoroughly described in [21]. Analyzed system is illustrated 
by Figure 2.  
The “The Victim trusts the Intruder” attack is based on a SYN-Flood attack and goes as 
follows: 
 
INTERNET
I (Intuder)
Host A V (vicm)
 
Fig. 2. (Example #2)  Scenario – “Intruder-Victim-Host A”   
I (Intruder) wants to pretend itself as A when talking to V. In response to the SYN packet 
that presumably came from A (in fact it came from I), V will reply with the ACK packet to 
start up a connection with A. When A sees the ACK to a request not generated by itself, it 
will send the RESET packet, and V drops the connection with I. In this case, the attack 
would  fail. This situation is depicted in Figure 3. 
Steps of scenarios (depicted in Figure 3) go as follows: 
- Intruder sends SYN packet to V signed as Host A (a,b),   
- V sends ACK packet to Host A (c),  
- Host A receives ACK packet (although it has not yet sent SYN package) (d),  
- Host sends RESET packet and finally connection is not being established (e, f, g). 
However, let us suppose that the attacker I uses SYN-Flood. In this case, I and its co-
operators send large number of SYN packets to A. This will keep A so busy, that the ACK 
packet sent from V is dropped and will go unnoticed by A. As a result, A will not send the 
RESET packet, and I can spoof A (see Fig. 4.). 
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ACK
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ACK
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INTERNET
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Host A V (vicm)
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ACK
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ACK
From A
RESET
g)
INTERNET
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From A
SYN
From V
ACK
From V
ACK
From A
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Fig. 3. “The Victim trusts the Intruder” scenario - unsuccessful attack 
Steps of scenarios (depicted in Figure 4) go as follows: 
- Intruder starts flooding with message Host A - DoS attack attempt 
- Denial of Service attack is successful (a),  
- V sends ACK packet to Host A (b),  
- ACK packet is being lost (or delivery and then answer to this packet is greatly delayed)  
- Connection with Intruder is established (c). 
The assumptions, more detailed system description and analysis is given in [21].  
3. Fault trees with time dependencies 
Fault tree with time dependencies (FTTD) technique is a top-down approach. It starts from 
identifying all hazards (dangerous situations) in a system and their duration time.  
Subsequently, for each hazard, a set of such events with time parameters that can cause the 
hazard is generated. The steps of the construction of the FTTD and its analysis are given in 
Fig.5. 
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Fig. 4. “The Victim trusts the Intruder” attack based on Syn-Flood 
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Fig. 5. The steps of the FTTD analysis 
If the hazard cannot occur, or the hazard occurrence probability is on an accepted level, or 
the product of the hazard occurrence probability by the hazard cost is on accepted level, 
then we finish the analysis. Otherwise, additional security support, e.g., monitoring and 
security system is indispensable, as it will be shown. 
3.1 The notation of the FTTD 
The notations of basic gates and events are presented in Fig.6. The tool for FTTD with basic 
gates analysis has been presented in paper [19]. The library, as a pattern for Visio 
application, that allows us to draw the FTTD and to save it in file that can be analysis with 
tool [18]. Time dependencies can be given numerically or parametrically.   
 
 
Fig. 6. The notations for a) events, c) causal AND gates, d) causal priority AND gates, 
d) generalization AND gates, e) generalization priority AND gates,  f) causal XOR gates, 
g) generalization XOR gates  
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In the generalization gates output event is the same as one of the input events (for XOR 
gate) or occur when the input events coexist (for AND gate) – start corresponds to the start 
of event which has occurred later, and the end corresponds to end of the event which has 
ended earlier. 
In causal gates the output event is the result of event (XOR gate) or coexistent events (AND 
gate) and can occur with delay to start of the cause (XOR gate) or the causes (AND gate). 
Duration time of the event does not depend on the cause. 
An event can be an input of the gate (cause) or be an output of the gate (effect). 
The meaning of symbols is as follows: 
• ǂS, ǃS – such static parameters for the events that express the minimal and maximal 
duration time of the event,  
• static parameters ǂS, ǃS for the causal AND gate are the minimal and maximal delays 
between the causes and the effect,  
• static parameters <ǂS d1,ǃS d1>, <ǂS d2,ǃS d2>  for the causal XOR gate are the minimal and 
maximal delays between the two causes (1,2) and the effect; if one input is used then the 
parameters for second input are omitted.  
The static parameters are the results of system architecture, parameters of the system 
components, algorithms, code execution time, and physics laws. Examples of the parameters 
could be the minimal and maximal times of: a transmission of a signal in the air, chemical 
reaction in chemical process industry, code execution, establishing the network connection, 
discovering the SYN-flood activity. If a duration time of an event is not known then it can be 
assumed that the minimal duration time is equal to 0, while the maximal one is infinity. In this 
case we will use the notation <0, ∞>. For the immediate events will use the symbol <0,0>.  
In order to analyze the FTTD, dynamic time parameters of their events and gates have to be 
known. These parameters concern: the duration times of the event occurrences, delay times 
of the gates, and the relations among the start and end time instants of the event occurrences 
associated with the gates. Instead of the event occurrence, we will shortly write: event. 
Definitions of the FTTD gates that have been described above, will be stated below, more 
detailed information can be found [5], [9], [10], [13]. 
We will use the following notation: 
• xs, xe , respectively, represents: the start, the end, respectively, of the event x,  
• τ(xs) - are the time instances when the event x started, 
• τ(xe) - are the time instances when the event x ended. 
3.2 The causal XOR gate 
Definition 1. Causal XOR gate: 
occur(z) ⇒ (occur (x) and ( duration(x) ≥ ǂS d1  ∧ τ(xs) + ǂS d1 ≤ τ(zs)≤ τ(xs) + ǃS d1))  
 ⊕ (occur (y) and (duration(y) ≥ ǂS d2  ∧ τ(ys) + ǂS d2 ≤ τ(zs)≤ τ(ys) + ǃS d2)) 
where:  
• ǂS d1, ǃS d1 - respectively, the minimal and the maximal delays times between the 
occurrence of the cause x and the effect z 
• ǂS d2, ǃS d2 – respectively, the minimal and the maximal delays time between the 
occurrence of the cause y and the effect z, 
• occur(z) – the predicate, the event z come into being in time, analogically: occur(x), 
occur(y), 
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• duration(x) – the predicate, event x duration in time, analogically: duration(y), 
• ⊕, ∧ − the logical symbol denotes respectively, “exclusive disjunction”, “logical 
conjunction”. 
The models of the causal XOR gates can be generalized by the causal XOR gates with: more 
than two input events and for one input only. 
The Causal XOR gate with output event z and two inputs events x, y is given in Fig.7. 
 
yx
C
z
 
Fig. 7. The Causal XOR gate 
The time relations between event x (cause) end event z (effect) are given in Fig. 8. 
 
 
Fig. 8. The time relations between event x (cause) and event z (effect) for causal XOR gate 
In causal XOR Gate the effect (event z) must occur not earlier that ǂS d1 and not later that ǃS d2 
counting from the start of causes (event x). Additionally, the effect can occur only before the 
end of cause (before τ(xe)). There are some examples (presented in Fig. 5) of time intervals in 
which event z can occur: 
• start of the event z must occur between: τ(xs)+ ǂS d1 and τ(xs)+ ǃS xe  (see Fig. 5a), 
because maximal duration of the event x is smaller than maximal delay time between 
causes and effect (ǃS xe≤ ǃS d1), 
• start of the event z must occur between: τ(xs)+ ǂS d1 and τ(xs)+ ǃS d1  (see Fig. 5b), 
because maximal delay time between causes and effect is smaller than maximal 
duration of the event x (ǃS xe≤ ǃS d1), 
• event z cannot occur, because duration of the event x is too small (see Fig. 5c). 
Let us assume minimal and maximal time for start and end of the event z are respectively ǂ 
zs, ǃzs, therefore ǂ zs≤τ(xs)≤ǃzs. Knowing that τ(xs)+ ǂS d1≤ τ(zs)  and τ(zs)≤ τ(xs)+ min{ ǃS d1, 
ǃS xe} hence ǂ zs= τ(xs)+ ǂS d1 and ǃzs= τ(xs)+ min{ ǃS d1, ǃS xe} – we have knowledge about time 
relation between causes and effect.  
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On the other hand, if ǂ zs, ǃzs are known then we can calculate minimal and maximal time in 
which event x can occur – what it can cause effect z (we can calculate ǂ xs, ǃxs). This 
knowledge allows us for elaboration of the inequalities – equalities system for each gate. 
Derivations of those formulas are of no requirement for our discussion (more information 
are given in [10], [13]), only the basic knowledge of the gate model and final form of its 
inequalities-equalities system is required. For causal XOR gate the inequalities-equalities 
system is given by formula (1).  
It is possible to use fault tree with time dependencies tools [18] as well. Using such tools it is 
essential for the construction the fault tree to use the toolbox in MS Visio or to prepare a file 
as it was shown in [19].  
       
                                (1a)
               
S S
d1 xe
S S S
xs zs d1 xe xs zs d1
S
xe zs xe xs xe
S S
d2 ye
S S s
ys zs d2 ye ys zs d2
S
ye zs ye ys ye
┙ ┚
┙ ┙ min{┚ ,┚ },     ┚ ┚ ┙
┙ ┙ ,┚ ┚ ┚
┙ ┚
┙ ┙ min{┚ ,┚ }, ┚ ┚ ┙
┙ ┙ , ┚ ┚ ┚
⎧ ≤⎪⎪ = − = −⎨⎪ = = +⎪⎩
⎧ ≤⎪⎪⊕ = − = −⎨⎪ = = +⎪⎩
                   (1b)
 (1) 
3.3 The generalization AND gate 
Definition 2. Generalization AND gate: 
occur(z) ⇒ occur(x) ∧ occur(y) ∧ overlap( x, y)  ∧  
max(τ (xs), τ (ys)) = τ (zs)  ∧ min(τ (xe), τ (ye)) = τ (ze) 
where: 
• overlap(x,y) – the predicate, the events x and y overlap in time. 
The examples of time relations between events x and y (causes) end event z (effect) are given 
in Fig. 9. 
 
 
Fig. 9. The time relations between event x (cause) and event z (effect) for generalization 
AND gate 
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The inequalities-equalities system is given by formula (2). 
 
, , ,
                                           (2a)
, ,
, ,
,
S
xs zs xs zs xe ye xe xs xe
S
ys xs ye ys xs ye ze ye ze
S S
ye xe
ys zs ys zs ye ze ye ze
S
xs ye xe xs ys xe ye xe
┙ ┙ ┚ ┚ ┙ ┙ ┚ ┚ ┚
┙ ┙ ┚ ,┚ ┚ ┙ ┙ ┚ ┚
┙ ┚
┙ ┙ ┚ ┚ ┙ ┙ ,┚ ┚
┙ ┙ ┚ ,┚ ┚ ┙ ┙ ,┚ ┚
⎧ = = = = +⎪⎨ = − = = =⎪⎩
≤
⊕ = = = =
= − = = =
                                (2b)
, ,
                                            (2c)
,
,
S
xs xe
S
ys zs ys zs ye xe ye ys ye
S
xs ys xe xs ys xe ze xe ze
S S
xe ye
xs zs xs
┚
┙ ┙ ┚ ┚ ┙ ┙ ,┚ ┚ ┚
┙ ┙ ┚ ,┚ ┚ ┙ ┙ ,┚ ┚
┙ ┚
┙ ┙ ┚
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪ +⎪⎩
⎧ = = = = +⎪⊕⎨ = − = = =⎪⎩
≤
⊕ = = ,                                     (2d)
,
zs xe ze xe ze
S S
ys xe ye ys xs ye xe ye ys ye
┚ ┙ ┙ ,┚ ┚
┙ ┙ ┚ ,┚ ┚ ┙ ┙ ,┚ ┚ ┚
⎧⎪⎪ = =⎨⎪ = − = = = +⎪⎩
 (2) 
3.4 The generalization XOR gate 
Definition 3. Generalization XOR gate: 
( ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )occur z occur x x z occur y y z⇒ ∧ = ⊕ ∧ =  
The example of time relations between events x (cause) and event z (effect) are given in  
Fig. 10. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. The time relations between event x (cause) and event z (effect) for generalization 
XOR gate 
The inequalities-equalities system is given by formula (3). 
 
                                   (3a)
                                  (3b)
xs zs xs zs
xe ze xe ze
ys zs ys zs
ye ze ye ze
┙ ┙ , ┚ ┚
┙ ┙ , ┚ ┚
┙ ┙ , ┚ ┚
┙ ┙ , ┚ ┚
= =⎧⎪⎨ = =⎪⎩
= =⎧⎪⊕ ⎨ = =⎪⎩
 (3) 
The other gates are not presented here as they do not occur in the FTTDs for given 
examples.   
The inequalities – equalities systems for other gates can be found in papers [9], [10], [13]. 
These systems are used in backward analysis from the hazard event to primary events. 
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4. FTTD analysis  
In order to simplify  the interpretation of the result analysis, the conventional moment of 
time „0” has to be established as start of the hazard, therefore: 
 α hs= 0 and ┚hs = 0 (4) 
We start the FTTD analysis by identifying the time interval, when the hazard can occur 
using formula (4). More information about it is given in [10]. 
 α he= α She  and ┚he= α S he  (5) 
Then, we consider the causes that can directly lead to the hazard and time relations between 
these causes and the hazard occurrences using formulas for adequate gates (for each hazard 
is the output event). Then we consider causes for the above causes, etc.  
As a result of this analysis, the following pairs for the events are obtained: 
<αzs, ǃzs>, <αze, ǃze> where: 
• αzs, ǃzs, respectively,  are be the earliest, the latest time instant of the start of the event z, 
• αze, ǃze, respectively,  be the earliest, the latest time instant of the end of the event z.  
These are time constraints imposed on events occurrence time in order to cause the hazard. 
4.1 FTTD analysis - example #1  
The fault tree for the system (called example #1 - depicted on Fig. 1.) can be found at Fig. 11.  
The left sub-tree (composed of events: 2, 4, 5, 6, 7) corresponds to the scenario (a) 
represented by Fig. 1  - the intruder uses the terminal T impersonated as the worker to get  
 
 
Fig. 11. The FTTD for Example #1 
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access to data. The right sub-tree (composed events 3, 8, 9, 10) corresponds to the scenario 
(b) in which Intruder uses his own laptop to get direct access to compromised (unsecured) 
server. 
Following steps should be undertaken in order to get meaningful result after the FTTD 
analysis. 
STEP 1: The calculations of the time parameters for HAZARD (event 1) using formulas (4) 
and (5) are being done.  As hazard is the output event in a generalization gate, the static 
parameters for hazard must be obtained from the input event. If they are equal, then we 
have one case (as in our case), if they are not  - we must consider more cases as it was shown 
in [13].  
Hence: 1 <0,0> <0, ∞>, where: 1 – number of top event, <ǂ1s=0, ǃ1s=0> < ǂ1e=0, ǃ1e=∞>. The 
event 1 starts in time instant “0” (ǂ1s≤τ(1s)≤ǃ1s, then 0≤τ(1s)≤0 and τ(1s)=0), the event 1 end 
instant satisfies the inequalities 0≤τ(xe) ≤∞. 
STEP 2: The calculations for the events 2 and 3.  
We make the calculation from formulas (3) for the generalization XOR gate.  
We have:  2 <0,0> <0, ∞>   
          xor  3 <0,0> <0, ∞> 
STEP 3: The calculations for the events 4 and 5. 
We make the calculation from formulas (2) for the generalization of AND gate and for time 
parameters for the event 2: <ǂ2s=0, ǃ2s=0> < ǂ2e=0, ǃ2e=∞>. 
We have: (4 <0,0> <0, ∞> and 5 <-∞,0> <0, ∞>)  
          xor (4 <-∞,0> <0, ∞>) and 5<0,0> <0, ∞>) 
We have two cases (the following two are the equal): 
• the event 5 occurs before the event 4 (then event 5 start must satisfy the inequalities: -
∞≤τ(5s)≤0) and the event 5 must end not earlier than event 4 starts (the event 5 end 
instant must satisfy the inequalities:  0≤τ(5e)≤ ∞); the event 4 start is in time instant “0”, 
the event 4 end satisfies the inequalities 0≤τ(4e)≤∞,   
• the event 4 occurs before the event 5 and the event 4 must end not earlier than the event 
5 starts: (-∞≤τ(2s)≤0, 0≤τ(2e)≤∞, 0≤τ(3s)≤0, 0≤τ(3e)≤ ∞). 
STEP 4: The calculation for the event 8 and 9 – are analogous as for 4 and 5 using 
formulas(2).  
NEXT STEPS: We analyze remaining events using formula (1b). The result of the analysis is 
depicted on Fig. 12. 
Each rectangle at Fig. 12 has the Minimal Cut Set (MCS). According to the paper [3] 
(excluding inscription: or in a proper time): Minimal cut set (MCS) - is such minimal set of 
events that if they all occur simultaneously (or in a proper sequence or in a proper time) then 
the top event occurs. If one event from MCS does not occur, then it causes that top event will 
also not occur. 
Words in bracket: 
• „in a proper sequence” -  extends standard definition of MCS of FTA to events 
occurring sequence dependencies, 
• „in a proper time” - extends standard definition of MCS of FTA to time dependencies, 
what is required for the FTTD. 
MCS for FTTD includes events with time conditions. For the event i we have: 
i <αis, ǃis > < αie, ǃie> 
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1<0,0> <0,∞>
2<0,0> <0,∞> 3<0,0> <0,∞>
. . .
4<0,0> <0,∞>
5<-∞,0> <0,∞>
4<-∞,0> <0,∞>
5<0,0> <0,∞>
6 <-tacc1_max,-tacc1_min> <0,∞>
5 <-∞,0> <0,∞>
6 <-tacc1_max,-tacc1_min> <0,∞>
7 <-∞,-tattack_min> <-∞,∞>
6 <-∞,-tacc1_min> <-∞,∞>
5 <-∞,0> <0,∞>
6 <-∞,-tacc1_min> <-∞,∞>
7 <-tattack_max,-tattack_min> <0,∞>
1<0,0> <0,∞>
2<0,0> <0,∞> 3<0,0> <0,∞>
. . .
8<0,0> <0,∞>
9<-∞,0> <0,∞>
8<-∞,0> <0,∞>
9<0,0> <0,∞>
8 <-tlog_max-tver_max-tacc_max,
-tlog_min-tver_min-tacc_min> <0,∞>
9 <-∞,0> <0,∞>
8 <-∞,-tlog_min-tver_min-tacc_min> <-∞,∞>
9 <-∞,0> <0,∞>
MCS1
MCS2
MCS3 MCS4
a)
b)
 
Fig. 12. FT analysis for Example #1 a) left sub-tree, b) right sub-tree 
The time conditions denotes, respectively:  the earliest (ǂis) and the latest (ǃis) time instants 
of the event i start, and the earliest (ǂie) and the latest (ǃie) time instants of the event i end. In 
order to cause the hazard (top event), the event i start instant (τ(is)) and the event i end 
instant (τ(ie)) must satisfy the inequalities: ǂis≤τ(is)≤ǃis, ǂie≤τ(ie)≤ǃie.  
The ǂis, ǃis, ǂie, ǃie can be counted with respect to reference time instant 0 (e.g. we assume 
ǃ1s=0, see [10]). 
If one event from MCS will not occur in the proper time (e.g. as result of introduced 
insurance, catalysts, equipment with proper parameters), it causes that the top event will 
also not occur. 
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Finally, the sets marked with gray color have been obtained. The final MCS have only 
events which are leaves of the FTTD. 
Interpretation for the MCS1 and MCS2:  
- Events 6 and 7 must occur together to cause the effect, we known that the duration time 
before effect must be minimally equal to tacc1_min (from MCS1), tattack_min (from MCS2), 
therefore 
min{tacc1_min, tattack_min} 
Interpretation for the MCS2 and MCS3: 
- analogically as it was for the events 6 and 7, it has minimal hazard time equal to 
tlog_min+tver_min+tacc_min. 
The use of FTTD is this case is not required; however taking advantage of formal methods is 
beneficial; it prevents creation an unequivocal description, we are able to make the precise 
specification and allow avoiding omission not so obvious aspects.   
4.2 FTTD analysis - example #2 
The fault tree for the system (example #2 - depicted on Fig. 2.) can be found at Fig. 13 (for 
more detailed information please refer to [21]).  
 
 
Fig. 13. The FTTD for “V trusts I” attack 
As it was presented in [21], the time parameters for the XOR causal gates of the right part of 
the FTTD are as follows: 
• tsmin, tsmax - the minimal and maximal time of sending the SYN packet from the I to V, 
• tans – time of preparing the acknowledgement ACK on the SYN packet, it is the activity 
of  V, 
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• tdmin – minimal time of establishing the connection between I and  V after time instant 
when V have sent the ACK. 
Event “Attack initialised” means the sending of the first SYN packet from V to A, i.e., SYN-
Flood has been started. 
The time parameters for the XOR causal gate of the left part of the FTTD are as follows: 
• tamin, tamax – minimal and maximal lengths of time interval which is sufficient to send 
such a number of SYN packets from  I to A that A cannot generate the RESET packet. 
The event “A is vulnerable to SYN-Flood” means that there are no such facilities at A that A 
can avoid the SYN-Flood. 
If the events 4. and 5. are overlapped in time then the Denial of Service occurs and  A cannot 
send the RESET packet to  V (“DoS A – successful (no RESET to V)”). 
Let the events 2. and 3. are overlapped in time. Hence, the connection between I and V has 
been established, and  A is not able to send the RESET packet to V. Therefore, “V trusts I”. 
The more detailed analysis was shown in [21]. Result of the analysis is depicted on Fig. 8. 
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Fig. 14. The analysis result 
Interpretation for the MCS A (please refer to [21]):  
1. time intervals connected with the event 7 are different; so after calculating the common 
part, we have: 7 <-tamax,-tamin> <0,∞> and 8 <-∞, -(tans+tdmin+tsmin)>  
<-∞,∞>,  
2. counting from sending the SYN package (the event 8), the hazard “V trusts I” will occur 
minimally after tans+tdmin+tsmin time units, but the attack needs to last until the 
event “V trusts I”. 
Interpretation for the MCS B: 
 The hazard can occur, when the event “Attack initialized” starts not later than tamin before 
the hazard. Analogically the event 8 starts not later than tans+tdmin+tsmin and ends – not 
earlier than in 0 time instant.  
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5. Application of result received in analysis 
5.1 System with protection 
The abovementioned timing properties can be used in designing protections and services. 
Now three proposals will be presented. 
1. If the time connected with service activity of one SYN packet is tSYN, then the amount of 
packets that can be serviced by server  in time before “V truts I” is about 
(tans+tdmin+tsmin)/tSYN. Hence, these packet numbers can be used for construction of 
the firewall rules or for specification of the requirements of attack detection, 
2. if in order to avoid the vulnerability to SYN-Flood attack, a protection, e.g. SYN 
Cookies, should be introduced or reintroduced in time no longer than tamin; but if the 
computer Intruder sends the packet (SYN to the V) simultaneously with the attack 
initialization, then the protection has to complete its procedure in time not longer than 
max {tamin, tans+tdmin+tsmin}, 
3. if the security is more important than functionality, then knowing the time parameters 
connected with the attack is essential, we can, e.g. monitor the load of the server (the 
testing of the SYN packets). If the server cannot respond before the time tans+tdmin+tsmin, 
then the RESET packets can reset all connections, 
4. Vulnerability of the server during the attack cannot be greater than min{tacc1_min, 
tattack_min}, hence we are able to periodically verify server protection,  
5. Intruder must be detected in tlog_min+tver_min+tacc_min time units; therefore e.g. “visual” 
verification of employees by a guard or cameras with face recognition system should be 
introduced. 
5.2 Safety audit procedure 
The efficient and safe IT assets management requires detailed knowledge of the 
infrastructure and underlying inventory items. All information that one may need for that 
purpose can be acquired during a security audit. 
The security audit is a process in which collection and evaluation of “evidence and 
premises” is taking place in order to determine whether the computer system and related 
resources are properly secured; to retain data integrity and desired level of security, and to 
provide relevant and reliable information that allow quickly and effectively achieve 
organization security objectives. Audit results can influence on resources utilization (to be 
used sparingly), enforce internal control mechanisms to provide reasonable means to assure 
that operational objectives be achieved and help control IT environment by enabling 
protection against adverse events or ultimately help in detection on time to minimize the 
effects that might have been already caused. 
The fault trees can be used to support construction of security audit procedure. The 
common knowledge is that any system as a whole is as weak as its weakest component, so 
each protection is equally important. Having this in mind, along with fault tree constructed 
and then analyzed one can be tempted to create a security survey that will constitute a basis 
for fully-fledged security audit.  Conclusions drawn after the analysis can be formulated as 
questions for administrators toward the systems that are about to be secured.  
Let us focus on two examples based on aforementioned assumptions: 
1. Having considered Fault Trees without time dependencies, one knows that events 4, 5 
and 8 are only prerequisites for hazard to occur. Based on that following questions may 
be added to a security survey: 
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- Is system still synflood attack prone?  
- Has synflood susceptibility been eliminated or considerably restricted? 
- Had SYN packets number being received from one source been limited?  
- If in a corporate environment, has any additional authentication (client’s terminal 
and server) mechanism been introduced?   
2. Having analyzed FT and a monitoring tool in place, one may want to create a metric 
that will be delivering information about a number of incoming packets in a defined 
timeframe.  
These are just simple examples that could be extended in a wide variety of cases to enforce 
security awareness and apply security rules. What’s more based on the response from the 
security survey generic firewall rules may be created and instantly adapted e.g.  
If system Y attack X prone then block INCOMING communication using protocol XYZ on port xxx. 
Having in mind example #1, one may be tempted to draw some conclusions out of its 
analysis. 
1.  Any person that is logged in should be double checked if he/she is the really the one 
that has been logged as. So following security rule can be established 
If a user is successfully logged, an additional identity check should be performed not later than … 
since the time when authentication was successful. 
2. Automated security check ups should be employed as a part of periodical audit 
routines (penetration tests, scripting based logging procedures etc.) 
6. Conclusions 
In the chapter, the FTTD analysis has been applied in pursue for such minimal sets of causes 
with time relations that can lead to the hazard. The hazard is the event when the security 
requirements are violated. It has been shown that the time relations between the events and 
the hazard could be applied in: construction of protections against the hazard occurrence or 
such a choice of network parameters that the hazard can be avoided. Additionally, the fault 
tree can be used for identification of security threats; and its analysis may help in 
introduction of attacks remedial measures, like discussed example of safety audit procedure.    
The FTTD analysis can be used not only for analysis of faults consequences, but it can be 
applied for checking whether a design of a network satisfies some safety requirements, too. 
What is more, there are such tools that can automate and help with the analysis of FTTD 
with four types of gates: generalization AND, XOR, priority AND and causal AND, XOR, 
priority AND. 
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